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Abstract
Although the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is yet to be realized, New Zealand has
suffered comparatively less than other countries, and there were no active cases in the country by
June 8, 2020. Building from best practices in emergency management research, several
preliminary lessons emerge from the country's response to the crisis that could be adapted for other
settings. In particular, the government acted early and decisively, developed national unity to
combat the virus, communicated effectively with the public, and adapted to changing
circumstances, especially to address shortcomings in the response. These preliminary lessons
provide some guidance in how to effectively respond to the virus through proactive, evidencebased, well-communicated policies.
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“We must go hard, and go early, and do everything we can to protect New Zealanders' health.”
-- Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, 14 March 2020 (Ardern, 2020)

Although the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is yet to be realized, it has already
caused over 400,000 deaths, infected millions of people, and affected the lives of people around
the world (Dong et al., 2020). Unsurprisingly, leaders and public officials have struggled to
respond to the threat of the virus and weigh the costs and benefits of policies that could save
lives but also lead to surging unemployment, economic depression, and sustained disruption to
local, national, and global economies.
From the start, Jacinda Ardern prioritized public health, seeking to deliver on her pledge
to protect all New Zealanders from the effects of COVID-19 (Vowles, 2020). While the virus’
final implications are yet to be determined, New Zealand appears to have suffered comparatively
less than other countries. By June 11, it had been three weeks since the last new case and there
were no active cases remaining in the country (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2020).
While New Zealand enjoys some advantages such as geographical isolation, a civil
political environment, strong central government, recent experience with crises and disasters, and
a small population, several preliminary lessons emerge from the country's response to the crisis
that could be adapted in other settings. In particular, the government acted early and decisively,
developed national unity to combat the virus, communicated effectively with the public, and
adapted changing circumstances, especially to address shortcomings in the response. In short,
other states could replicate New Zealand's approach to reduce the threat of COVID-19 and future
pandemics.

1

This article provides a brief overview of the New Zealand government's response to
COVID-19, before discussing specific aspects of their response that can be adopted elsewhere in
accordance with best practices from emergency management research. These preliminary lessons
provide some guidance in how to effectively respond to the virus through proactive, evidencebased, well-communicated policies.

1. New Zealand's Response to COVID-19
The New Zealand response to COVID-19 is led by Jacinda Ardern, her Cabinet and their
Ministries, the Director-General of Health Ashley Bloomfield, Director of Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Sarah Stuart-Black, Chief Science Advisor Juliet Gerrard, Police
Commissioner Mike Bush, and businessman Rob Fyfe, among others (Strongman, 2020a). A
group of 11 experts also advise the Minister of Health about COVID-19 (Morton, 2020). In
consultation with the Ministry of Health and their advisory group, Jacinda Ardern adopted an
“elimination strategy” to the virus (Cave, 2020).
The New Zealand response initially involved monitoring the situation in China, and
evacuating New Zealanders from affected regions. However, as the virus rapidly spread the
government had to make consequential decisions about the best response to the pandemic. To
hold the government accountable for its response, they formed an Epidemic Response
Committee led by Simon Bridges, then-leader of the opposition. Table 1 presents a potted
summary of the country's response.
.
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Table 1: A Potted Timeline of the New Zealand Government’s Response to COVID-19.
Date
January 30, 2020
February 3, 2020
February 28, 2020
March 2, 2020
March 5, 2020
March 11, 2020
March 14, 2020
March 16, 2020
March 17, 2020
March 19, 2020
March 21, 2020
March 23, 2020
March 25, 2020
March 26, 2020
March 29, 2020
April 7, 2020
April 9, 2020
April 20, 2020
April 27, 2020
May 14, 2020
June 8, 2020
June 9, 2020

Event
Charter flight evacuates New Zealanders from Wuhan, China.
Passengers are quarantined for 14 days.
Entry restrictions on foreign nationals traveling from mainland China.
People entering New Zealand from mainland China required to self-isolate for 14 days.
First case of COVID-19 reported in New Zealand.
Entry restrictions placed on people traveling from Iran.
Entry restrictions placed on people traveling from northern Italy and South Korea.
First confirmed person-to-person transmission of COVID-19 in New Zealand.
WHO declares COVID-19 a pandemic.
All people entering the country must self-isolate for 14 days, except arrivals from Pacific Island countries. Cruise ships
are banned.
Announcement that all tourists who do not self-quarantine on arrival will be deported.
Initial $12.1 billion recovery package launched for health, business, and income support.
28 cases of COVID-19 in New Zealand, all linked to overseas travel.
Indoor gatherings of more than 100 people are banned.
Borders are closed to everyone except New Zealand citizens and permanent residents.
52 confirmed cases in New Zealand.
Introduction of a four-level alert system, New Zealand placed at Level 2.
For the first time, community transmission cannot be ruled out.
New Zealand placed at Level 3, additional restrictions imposed.
State of Emergency declared.
New Zealand enters Level 4, lockdown restrictions imposed for four weeks.
First death caused by COVID-19 in New Zealand.
Recovered cases exceed new cases for the first time.
29 new cases of COVID-19 are reported, the lowest daily total since March 23.
Level 4 is extended for another week, with Level 3 to be phased in.
New Zealand enters Level 3, with some lockdown restrictions eased.
New Zealand re-enters Level 2, with further restrictions eased.
New Zealand has no active cases of COVID-19.
New Zealand enters Level 1 for the first time with minimal internal restrictions in place.

Source: Strongman (2020b)
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Figure 1: New Zealand COVID-19 Alert Levels Summary (updated May 25, 2020).

Source: New Zealand Government (2020)
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In early February, foreign nationals were prevented from traveling from mainland China,
and this was subsequently extended to cover travelers from Iran, northern Italy, and South Korea
as cases emerged in those regions. In mid-March these restrictions were increased again, before
the unprecedented step was taken to closer the borders for everyone but New Zealand citizens
and permanent residents from March 19 after 28 cases had emerged. Any travelers from affected
regions were required to self-isolate, but there was little enforcement initially, and the
government later declared they would deport non-compliant visitors.
On March 21, the New Zealand government introduced the four-level alert system, and
they placed the country in Level 2.2 Risk assessment and corresponding social distancing
measures are outlined in Figure 1. After community transmission could not be ruled out, the
government raised the country to Level 3 on March 23, and three days later, lockdown
restrictions were imposed for a four week period, which was then extended until April 27. The
country then re-entered Level 3, and on May 14 re-entered Level 2. After no active cases
remained on June 8, New Zealand moved to Level 1 for the first time on June 9.
The Treasury announced a $NZ12.1 billion recovery package on March 17, and subsequent
initiatives have increased this figure up to $NZ52 billion in wage subsidies, leave and selfisolation support, business tax changes, financial guarantees for small and medium-sized
businesses, and support for vulnerable populations, among others (Robertson, 2020). To put this
in context, the latter figure constitutes almost half the government's entire 2019 annual budget
expenditure.

Incidentally, these measures are a standard against which governments' social distancing
measures are assessed by the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and
Evaluation (2020).
2
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Testing for COVID-19 improved substantially over time. From just 12 tests conducted on
March 9, the average daily number of tests was 3,870 in April and 4,571 in May (New Zealand
Ministry of Health, 2020). By June 10, 301,882 tests had been conducted in total (New Zealand
Ministry of Health, 2020).
To date, New Zealand has contained the spread of the virus in the country. As of June 11,
New Zealand had a total of 1,504 cases of the virus, of which 1,154 cases are confirmed and 350
are considered probable cases (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2020). 22 people have died as a
result of COVID-19, 1,482 people have recovered from COVID-19, and no cases remain active
(New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2020).

Figure 2: Deaths, Active Cases, and Recovered Cases in New Zealand, March 1-June 11, 2020.

Sources: McDowall & Garcia (2020); New Zealand Ministry of Health (2020)
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Figure 2 shows the number of deaths, active cases (including confirmed and probable
cases), and recovered cases, demonstrating the relative success of social distancing in New
Zealand. First, the figure illustrates that New Zealand entered the Level 4 lockdown before the
first COVID-19 fatality. Second, the figure shows that after an initial peak in early April, the
number of active cases steadily decreased while recovered cases increased. Third, by the middle
of May, there were considerably fewer active cases than there were at the beginning of the Level
4 lockdown, demonstrating the effectiveness of the containment measures. Finally, the figure
shows that by June 8, there were no remaining active cases.

2. Preliminary Lessons from New Zealand's Response
New Zealand's response to COVID-19 has been successful in flattening the curve and reducing
the spread of the virus. From the emergency management literature, there are several key lessons
from its response that could be adopted elsewhere.

2.1 Go Hard, Go Early
First, investing in prevention is much more efficient and cost-effective than responding to a crisis
(Healy & Malhotra, 2009; Perry et al., 2001). Like most states, New Zealand was not fully
prepared for a pandemic (Cameron et al., 2019), but when COVID-19 cases emerged in the
country, the Ardern government acted quickly to contain the virus despite the immediate impact
on the agricultural, hospitality, and tourism industries especially.
This included unprecedented actions like requiring almost all arrivals to self-isolate for 14
days upon arrival on March 14 when the country had just six active cases; closing the borders to
everyone but New Zealand citizens and Permanent Residents on March 19 when there were 28
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active cases; and imposing a strict lockdown on March 26 when there were 283 cases but no
deaths (New Zealand Government, 2020b). Furthermore, the government stayed the course, with
Level 3 restrictions remaining in place until May 14, and Level 2 restrictions remaining in place
until no active cases remained, despite considerable political pressure from members of their
governing coalition and the opposition to ease restrictions (Graham-McLay, 2020), and the
looming general election in September.
The response suggests that “Go hard, go early” was not just a soundbite, but it
encapsulated the government's approach to reduce the spread of the virus from the start. While it
may no longer be possible for many governments to act early, they could adopt similarly
stringent social distancing measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 and replicate these
policies in future pandemics.

2.2 Unite Against COVID-19
Second, despite the continuing prevalence of “disaster myths,” societies frequently rally together
during disasters and crises (Johnson, 1987; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). The Ardern government
harnessed this knowledge by creating a campaign built upon “uniting against COVID-19,” where
the public bind together to defeat the virus, especially when it required sacrificing personal
freedoms for the greater good during lockdown.
As the success of social distancing is contingent on compliance with government
instructions, it was critical that people bought into the task. The “Unite Against COVID-19”
campaign helped develop a collective sense of purpose (Duncan, 2020), and public opinion polls
consistently showed over 80 percent support for the government's actions including the
lockdown (Cooke, 2020; Cooke & Malpass, 2020; Coughlan, 2020; Manhire, 2020).
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Beyond supporting lockdown measures, location trend data suggests that New Zealanders
also complied with them. By April 17, the data suggested reductions of 90 percent in retail and
recreation, 81 percent in parks, 87 percent in transit stations, and 72 percent in workplaces
compared to the baseline (Google, 2020).
Collectively, the unifying campaign helped secure support for lockdown measures that
would not otherwise be tolerated given their impact on civil liberties (Edwards, 2020; Gillespie,
2020). As attention turns to the long-term economic recovery from the considerable effects on
the national economy, New Zealanders are now asked to “unite for the recovery” (New Zealand
Government, 2020a). Governments in other countries could pursue similar campaigns to help
create the collective will to temporarily suspend regular life to reduce the spread of the virus, and
recover from its effects once it is contained.

2.3 Effective Communication
A third lesson for other governments is the importance of effective risk communication, ensuring
people understand and trust the messages conveyed by the government in order to keep the
public safe. Previous research demonstrates the importance of warning messages that reach their
intended targets, especially in diverse populations (Mileti, 1999; Mitchell, 2003; Perry et al.,
2001; Phillips & Morrow, 2007). The New Zealand response featured effective communication
in a variety of settings.
First, Ardern has communicated policy initiatives well, helping the public understand their
goals and their obligations to reduce the spread of the disease in daily briefings and social media
posts (Wilson, 2020). For example, Ardern asked New Zealanders to stay in their household
“bubble” as part of social distancing, and she asked people to stay home, stay safe, and to act as
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though they already have COVID-19 to reduce the spread of the disease (Fifield, 2020; Wilson,
2020). For the duration of the lockdown she was joined by the Director-General of Health
Ashley Bloomfield, who developed an earnest following for his competence and knowledge
(Fifield, 2020).
Second, official communications also appear to be designed to be clear and concise. For
example, the different levels of the alert system in Figure 1 are presented so that their different
motivations and implications can be understood. Similarly, rules for the lockdown were shared
through an emergency alert prior to entering Level 4 that combined both clear instructions and
unifying messages (Fifield, 2020).
Third, the government created a COVID-19-dedicated website so people could find
information without having to find the right government department for the best information.
The website describes the alert system, and provides information relating to individuals,
businesses, and communities. Information is also provided in 28 languages in an attempt to reach
diverse linguistic communities within New Zealand, and many translations also included
accompanying videos (Mitchell, 2003; Phillips & Morrow, 2007).
Finally, government efforts were aided by excellent science communication in the public
sphere. Alongside public and private efforts to assist the government’s response (Morton, 2020;
Murdoch et al., 2020), scientists communicated best practices to the public to help contain the
spread of COVID-19. Among others, an outstanding example is the collaboration of Dr. Siouxsie
Wiles and illustrator Toby Morris in a series of articles explaining risk, hygiene practices, and
how to reduce the spread of COVID-19 (see The Spinoff, 2020).
While effective communication and consistent messaging is arguably easier in small
countries with a strong central government, these efforts to communicate government policy
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effectively across all groups in the country can be replicated in other settings to reduce the spread
of COVID-19. Given the importance of social distancing, it is vital this information is conveyed
to the public with the right tone and tenor to generate public buy-in.

2.4 Adapting to an Evolving Situation
Finally, the New Zealand government has been adept at responding to a rapidly evolving
situation. Prior research demonstrates that the best leadership during crises involves changing
plans to adapt to the situation rather than rigidly enforcing existing plans (Dynes, 1994; Neal &
Phillips, 1995; Webb & Chevreau, 2006).
Like other countries, New Zealand was unprepared for the pandemic, and the government
made mistakes in their handling of the crisis. For example, there were too few tests available in
March, there was insufficient engagement and coordination with Māori communities (Parahi,
2020), and there was some confusion about the requirements of self-isolation upon arrival into
the country. Initial containment measures proved insufficient to prevent COVID-19 from
spreading in New Zealand.
However, the Ardern government has generally responded to errors and oversights by
correcting them. For example, tests are now widely available across the country after the slow
start (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2020), the government released a Māori COVID-19
response plan including the formation of a Māori Touchstone Group and almost $50 million in
assistance for Māori health providers (Johnsen, 2020), and arrival documentation was changed so
that arrivals became aware of social distancing requirements before the borders were closed.
Furthermore, decisions about the appropriate level have been based on scientific expertise
and expert advice. For example, after four weeks of Level 4 lockdown conditions, Jacinda
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Ardern extended it for another week to increase the chances of eliminating the virus. Rather than
pre-judging when to ease restrictions, each decision has been made on evidence available at the
time.
There remain important areas for improvement in the New Zealand response, including the
provision of personal protective equipment (PPE), the long-term implications of the lockdown on
civil liberties, and ongoing concerns about the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on Māori
and Pasifika communities. These issues need to be satisfactorily addressed in the near future to
continue an effective approach as the country emerges from lockdown.
However, the Ardern government has largely adapted to changing conditions to respond
effectively. Other states and local governments could adopt similar approaches by reacting to
changing conditions and responding to up-to-date evidence to contain COVID-19 and protect
their communities.

3. Conclusion
Although New Zealand has different circumstances to a lot of other countries, it is also true that
local and national governments learn from others as a matter of course. Not every policy might
be viable in every other context, but generalizable lessons from the New Zealand include
launching preventive action early, actively encouraging public compliance with social distancing
by uniting the country together, effectively communicating with all groups in the population
through a combination of inspiring rhetoric and clear instructions, and adapting to the changing
situation and making decisions based on conditions at the time. Above all, the Ardern
government prioritized keeping the public safe, and the relative success of their efforts reflect
this emphasis on public health.
12

Given the persistence of COVID-19, it is not clear that New Zealand will ultimately
succeed in its elimination strategy despite having no active cases in June 2020. Furthermore, the
long-term economic implications of stringent lockdowns are not yet known, and the costs could
be especially burdensome on an economy reliant on agriculture, tourism, and hospitality.
However, at this point, the government's response provides a model of what is possible if
leaders act early and decisively (Sridhar, 2020). Given the global news coverage of New
Zealand's success, leaders might be able to adapt policies for their community that might not
otherwise be possible, especially if the public supports similar policies (Jamieson & Van Belle,
2018, 2019).
Around the world, governments and public officials are forced to make difficult decisions
about public health which will likely have lasting consequences regardless of the outcome. As
New Zealand has contained COVID-19 thus far, it makes sense to look south for some direction
through this crisis.
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